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IMIn Working Paper Series 
The IMIn working paper series presents current research in the field of international 
migration. The series was initiated by the International Migration Institute (IMI) since its 
foundation at the University in Oxford in 2006, and has been continued since 2017 by the 
International Migration Institute network (IMIn).The papers in this series (1) analyse 
migration as part of broader global change, (2) contribute to new theoretical approaches, 
and (3) advance understanding of the multi‐level forces driving migration and experiences of 
migration. 
Abstract  
What have been the main trends and drivers of international migration over the last century, 
and to what extent have migration policies been effective in shaping the volume, direction, 
timing, and selection of immigration and emigration? This paper reviews the insights on 
migration trends, determinants and policy effects gained through the DEMIG (Determinants 
of International Migration) project. Questioning popular perceptions of accelerating 
international migration, the increase in global migration has remained proportional to the 
increase in world population. The main migratory shifts in the second half of the twentieth 
century have been directional, particularly through the decline of Europe as an area of origin 
and the emergence of Europe and the Gulf as new global destinations. This shift in migration 
movements towards Europe has been associated by an overall liberalisation of migration 
policies, which have increasingly focused on the selecting of migrants rather than controlling 
numbers per se. Most rules around legal entry, stay and exit of migrants have been relaxed, 
but a combination of visa and border control policies have served to prevent the entry of 
asylum seekers and other ‘unwanted’ migrants. Our analysis shows that it would therefore be 
excessive to conclude that borders are ‘beyond control’ (cf. Bhagwati 2003), and that 
migration policies are generally effective. Yet several ‘substitution effects’ limit or undermine 
the effectiveness of migration controls by (1) redirecting migration through other 
geographical routes and destinations (spatial substitution), (2) diverting migration through 
other legal and unauthorized channels (categorical substitution), (3) “now or never” 
migration surges in anticipation of restrictions (intertemporal substitution) and (4) 
discouraging return and interrupting circulation (reverse flow substitution). These expose 
fundamental policy dilemmas as well as the importance to look beyond migration policies. 
Our results show the importance of accounting for the complex and often counterintuitive 
ways in which structural social, economic, and political factors affect migration in mostly 
indirect, but powerful ways that largely lie beyond the reach of migration policies.    
 
Keywords: international migration, migration determinants, migration policies, policy 
effectiveness, state, development 
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Natter, Simona Vezzoli & María Villares‐Varela 
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1. Introduction 
What have been the main trends and drivers of international migration over the last century, and 
to what extent have policies been effective in regulating migration patterns and trends? Are states 
generally effective in controlling migration? These questions go to the core of contemporary 
debates about migration. In wealthy countries, immigration, in particular of low-skilled workers 
and asylum seekers from poorer countries, has been increasingly viewed as a problem in need of 
control. A common perception is that migration policies have become more restrictive while 
international migration has accelerated (Castles, de Haas and Miller 2014; Massey et al. 1998). 
These two assumptions underpin the frequent assertion that migration policies have failed or 
that their effectiveness is limited (Castles 2004). For instance, Bhagwati (2003: 99) argued that 
“the ability to control migration has shrunk as the desire to do so has increased. Borders are 
largely beyond control and little can be done to really cut down on immigration”. Immigration 
control sceptics tend to argue that international migration is mainly driven by structural factors 
such as labour market demand, income inequalities, and conflict in origin countries, factors on 
which migration policies have little, if any, influence, while migrant networks, employers and 
other intermediaries (such as recruiters, lawyers and smugglers) create the social structures that 
give migration movements their own momentum (cf. Castles and Miller 2009; Krissman 2005; 
Massey 1990; Xiang and Lindquist 2014).  
   
Others have contested the popular assumption that immigration policies have become more 
restrictive by arguing that immigration policies of Western liberal democracies have a built-in 
tendency to become more liberal (Freeman 1995; Hollifield 1992a; Joppke 1998). Although 
modern states have unprecedented technical means to control borders, in practice they have 
limited resources, legal abilities and willingness to do so. According to this reasoning, the level of 
immigration restrictiveness is often limited because states are bound to human rights such as the 
right of family life, and the protection of asylum seekers, children and other vulnerable groups. 
Hypothesizing a ‘liberal paradox’, Hollifield (1992b) argued that liberal democracies face 
embedded limitations in the form of constitutional norms and principles, which act to “constrain 
the power and autonomy of states both in their treatment of individual migrants and in their 
relation to other states” (Hollifield 1992b: 577). In practice, this implies that courts regularly 
overturn attempts by elected leaders to restrict immigration and travel of foreigners (cf. Joppke 
2001). 
  
However, this does not necessarily mean that migration policies have failed and that states are 
generally incapable to control migration. One could argue that immigration would have been 
even higher without migration restrictions. Because we lack a good counterfactual, the observation 
that immigration has continued or increased alongside migration restrictions is no proof that 
migration policies have been ineffective. Conversely, decreasing migration is no evidence for 
successful restrictions as this can also be the result of factors such as an economic recession in 
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destination countries, or rapid economic growth or the end of conflict in origin countries. 
Deriving conclusions merely based on (statistical) associations between migration policies and 
migration can therefore be misleading and subject to political manipulation. For instance, it has 
been contested whether the post-2008 decrease in regular and unauthorized migration from 
Mexico to the US was mainly the result of increased border enforcement and deportations or 
rather triggered by the economic crisis and concomitant slump in US labour demand, as well as 
improving economic conditions and a slowing down of population growth in Mexico. This 
example also points to a more general ‘receiving country bias’ in migration research, which tends 
to ignore the effects of the socio-economic conditions and emigration policies in origin states.  
 
This debate shows the need for an empirical verification of the widespread assumptions that (1) 
international migration has accelerated and that (2) migration policies have become more 
restrictive. It also shows the need for better qualitative and quantitative methodological 
approaches to enhance our insights into the causal links between migration policies and 
migration trends, and to disentangle the specific effects of migration policies from other 
structural migration determinants. After all, it is not really surprising if quantitative studies find 
that restrictions reduce immigration to some extent. The real question is how big the role of migration 
policies is compared to- and in interaction with- other migration determinants in origin and destination 
countries. Do migration policies have a small and temporary influence on long-term migration 
trends, or is their influence more structural and long lasting? How do such restrictions affect 
return migration, and to what extent do they have knock-on effects by diverting migration to 
other countries, by interrupting circulation, or by affecting the timing of migration, such as 
through triggering ‘now or never’ migration surges?  
 
Instead of asking whether migration policies have failed or not, determining the relative magnitude 
of policy effects and assessing the political and economic conditions under which migration 
policies seem to be relatively effective seems to be a more realistic and useful way of assessing 
what policies can – and cannot – achieve. This analytical approach requires that we embed our 
assessment of migration policy effectiveness into a more comprehensive understanding of 
migration determinants. Although most researchers probably agree that macro-contextual 
economic and political factors, as well as meso-level factors such as networks, all play an 
important role in migration, so far there has been a lack of evidence on their relative weight and 
mutual interaction. However, we need such precision to move beyond rather generic statements 
and platitudes about factors playing some role in migration of the ‘push-pull’ genre in order to 
jointly assess long-term trends and patterns in international migration and migration policies. The 
key questions thus are:  
 
 What have been the main international migration trends? 
 What are the main drivers of international migration in origin and destination countries? 
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 What has been the nature and evolution of migration policies?  
 What has been the effect of migration policies independently of and in interaction with other 
migration determinants?   
  
These were the leading research question of the DEMIG project – The Determinants of International 
Migration: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment of Policy, Origin and Destination Effects, which 
received core funding from the European Research Council (ERC). This five-year project (2010-
2014), which was conducted at Oxford University’s International Migration Institute (IMI), 
aimed to generate new theoretical and empirical insights into the way policies shape migration 
processes in their interaction with other migration determinants in origin and destination 
countries. In particular, we investigated how migration policies of destination and origin states 
shape the volume, geographical orientation, composition and timing of international migration. 
The analysis of policy effects required the compilation of databases on bilateral migration flows 
(DEMIG C2C), total in- and outflows (DEMIG TOTAL), migration policies (DEMIG 
POLICY), and travel visa requirements (DEMIG VISA) with a wide — and unprecedented —
coverage in terms of countries and years (for more details on the DEMIG databases, see Annex 
1).  
 
Drawing on the DEMIG POLICY and DEMIG VISA databases, we analysed the nature and 
evolution of migration policies (de Haas, Natter and Vezzoli 2016; Flahaux 2016) and global visa 
regimes (Czaika, de Haas and Villares-Varela 2017). We used several empirical strategies to study 
migration patterns, their determinants and policy effects. While DEMIG TOTAL enables to 
understand the effects of migration policies on total immigration and emigration, DEMIG C2C 
was crucial in understanding migration trends and assessing the effects of bilateral policies (such 
as those in DEMIG VISA) on the volume and timing of immigration and emigration (cf. Czaika 
and Haas 2016; Flahaux 2014). Analyses of migration on a global level (Czaika and de Haas 
2014a), as well as targeted studies focusing on Europe (de Haas, Vezzoli and Villares-Varela 
2018), North America (Mahendra 2014b), Africa (Flahaux and de Haas 2014; Natter 2014a), 
Australia (de Haas 2011a) and the Caribbean region (Flahaux and Vezzoli 2017; Vezzoli and 
Flahaux 2017) drew on a combination of DEMIG data and other migration population (‘stock’) 
and flow datasets, in particular the Global Bilateral Migration Database (GBMD) (Özden et al. 
2011). We also implemented micro-level analyses to understand the role of policies for return 
migration to Senegal, by combining DEMIG POLICY data with the Migration between Africa and 
Europe (MAFE) surveys (Flahaux 2016). 
 
In addition to large-scale quantitative analyses, we conducted mixed-method, historical and 
comparative studies to capture the long-term interactions between migration determinants and 
the complex role of policies pursued by origin and destination states in shaping the volume, 
geographical orientation, composition and timing of international migration. Regional analyses 
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on the role of independence and the establishment of border regimes focussed on Guyana, 
Suriname and French Guiana (Vezzoli 2014b) and on the Maghreb states of Morocco, Algeria 
and Tunisia (de Haas 2014b; Natter 2014b). EU enlargement processes were studied to assess 
the effect of border liberalizations on short- and long-term migration patterns (de Haas, Vezzoli 
and Villares-Varela 2018). Finally, studies on the role of non-migration policies in origin 
countries (Mahendra forthcoming; Kureková 2011a; 2011b) provided new insights into the 
important, but often ignored role of origin-country factors such as economic development, 
trade, inequality, social security and welfare in migration. The remainder of this paper presents 
and discusses the main insights that emerged from DEMIG and DEMIG-related projects and 
how these relate to other recent scholarship on this issue.  
 
  
2. Trends and patterns of global migration 1945-2010  
 
The changing geography of world migration  
  
Our research challenges the widespread idea that the volume, diversity, geographical scope, and 
overall complexity of international migration have increased as part of globalization processes. It 
is commonly thought that international migration has accelerated over the past decades, that 
migrants travel over increasingly long distances, and that origins and destinations have become 
much more diverse (Arango 2000: 291) as a result of advances in transport and communication 
technology. Scholars have therefore argued that there has been a ‘globalisation of migration’, 
which is “the tendency for more and more countries to be crucially affected by migratory 
movements at the same time” (Castles and Miller 2009: 10). However, between 1950 and 2015 
the proportion of international migrants has remained relatively stable, and has been fluctuating 
at levels of between 2.5 and 3.5 per cent of the world population. In other words, the total 
number of international migrants has increased at a roughly equal pace as the world population.  
  
Migration patterns have nonetheless substantially changed and our analyses confirm that the 
main post-WWII migratory shifts have been directional. A key factor underlying this fundamental 
change in the global migration geography has been the transformation of Europe from a 
continent of colonizers and emigrants to a global migration destination since the 1950s (see 
Figure 1). While for centuries Europeans emigrated to conquer, colonize, or settle in foreign 
lands in the Americas, Africa and Asia, these patterns were reversed in the post-WWII era. 
Decolonization led to the rapid end of large-scale European emigration and more generally to 
the massive departure of European settlers, colonial administrators and military personnel, such 
as from ‘British Africa’ to the UK, from French West Africa back to the ‘metropole’, and from 
Portuguese colonies back to Portugal. At the same time, populations of European or mixed 
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European-native descent migrated to Europe, such as from Indonesia to the Netherlands 
(Lucassen and Lucassen 2012) or from Algeria to France (Collyer 2003).  
 
Figure 1. Estimated annual migration to EU15 countries1 by region of origin, 1950-2008
 
Source: DEMIG C2C Database 
  
The emigration of European settlers and minority populations in the political and economic 
upheavals around independence processes in former colonies created social and migratory ties 
that subsequently facilitated the (recruitment-based or more spontaneous) migration of migrant 
workers in the post-WWII decades. Belgium and the Netherlands, which did not recruit labour 
in (former) colonies, and Germany, Sweden and Switzerland, which did not have a substantial 
colonial experience, all actively recruited labour, initially in southern Europe, and from the 1960s 
increasingly in Turkey, Yugoslavia and the Maghreb region (Berriane, de Haas and Natter 2015; 
Natter 2014b).  
 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, formerly communist countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe also evolved into labour suppliers to Western European economies. This created a new 
‘migration frontier’ (Skeldon 1997) on the European southern and eastern periphery. In the 
1990s, the wars in the former Yugoslavia led to hundreds of thousands of refugees to seek 
refuge in Western European countries. Since the 2000s, immigration from Latin America to 
Europe has also increased, and while migration within and from African countries has remained 
low in comparison to other world regions, and African emigration to Europe has generally been 
dominated by the Maghreb, in recent decades Europe-bound migration from sub-Saharan Africa 
has increased (Flahaux and de Haas 2014). These trends have increased the diversity of migrant 
origins in Western, Southern and Northern Europe. 
  
																																																								
1 The EU15 countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom 
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Decolonization, fast economic growth and demographic transitions since the mid-20th century 
thus had fundamental impacts on the direction – rather than the relative size – of global 
migrations and is reflected in the changing composition of immigrant populations in Western 
Europe, North America, as well as in other advanced economies. With the drying up of Europe 
as a source of migrants in the 1950s and 1960s, the traditional European settler societies of the 
US, Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand increasingly relied on immigration from 
Asia (for North America, Australia and New Zealand), Latin America (particularly in the case of 
the US), and, to a more limited extent, Africa (see Figure 2 and 3). This also revived much older 
migratory connections between Asia and the Americas (including the Caribbean) that were 
originally formed in the nineteenth century, partly through systems of indentured labour and 
other forms of colonial or ‘hegemonic’ recruitment (see McKeown 2004; Vezzoli 2015). This  
went along with an abolishment of racist ‘Whites-only’ immigration policies in European settler 
colonies of United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (FitzGerald and Cook-Martín 
2014).  
 
Figure 2. Estimated annual migration to Canada and USA by region of origin, 1950-20102 
 
Source: DEMIG C2C Database 
 
																																																								
2 Inflows from the Americas include migration from Canada to the USA, and from the USA to Canada;  
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Figure 3. Estimated annual migration to Australia/New Zealand by region of origin, 1950-20103 
 
Source: DEMIG C2C Database 
  
Particularly since the 1973 Oil Crisis, the Gulf countries as well as Libya emerged as new global 
migration destinations, initially for workers from oil-poor Arab countries but increasingly also 
from Asian countries, such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Pakistan, India and Nepal, as well as 
from sub-Saharan African countries, such as Eritrea and Ethiopia (cf. Fargues 2011; Thiollet 
2007). At the same time, the fast economic growth of East Asian countries, starting with Japan 
and followed by Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea, would contribute to 
redirecting migration within Asia towards those new growth poles (Skeldon 2006).  
 
The changing composition of world migration  
 
Most international migrants move for work and family reasons. Particularly during economic 
recessions, family migration can often outnumber labour migration, although family migration is 
often a consequence of the settlement of workers, so to some extent a “derivative” of labour 
migration. Refugee numbers are comparatively small and have shown more fluctuations, which 
mainly depend on the level of conflict in origin areas (Hatton 2009). Between 1990 and 2010, the 
number of refugees showed an overall declining trend, reflecting the decreasing level of violent 
conflicts, particularly in Africa and Latin America. Between 2010 and 2016 the total number of 
refugees in the world has increased again, from 16 to 22.5 million, mainly as a result of the Syrian 
civil war (UNHCR 2017). Through most of the post-WWII era, refugees have represented less 
than 10 per cent of the global migrant population. More than 80 per cent of all refugees are 
currently staying in developing countries (such as Kenya, Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, Jordan and 
Lebanon), and this share has increased rather than decreased over recent decades (Czaika 2015a).  
 
																																																								
3 Inflows from Oceania include migration from Australia to New Zealand and from New Zealand to 
Australia. Inflow data for Australia and New Zealand are not available for the years 1972-1974. This 
graph does not include immigrants to Australia from an unspecified origin.  
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Over the years, overall skill levels of immigrants have generally gone up. This largely reflects the 
overall increase in education levels worldwide, as well as the increasing demand for skilled labour 
in the highly specialized and segmented labour markets of middle- and high-income countries 
alongside a sustained demand for lower skilled migrant labour in agriculture, construction, 
catering and domestic and care work (Czaika 2018). A gender-specific analysis of DEMIG C2C 
data questioned the widespread assumption that international migration has undergone a process 
of feminization (see also Donato et al. 2011). In fact, the proportion of women in yearly inflows 
to OECD countries has fluctuated around 46 per cent over the last six decades and has actually 
slightly decreased in recent decades (see Figure 4). This suggests that the alleged process of 
feminization of migration primarily concerns the increasing visibility of – and attention to – the 
role of female migrants, and perhaps also the increasing percentage of women migrating as 
independent labour migrants and students, compared to a past in which most women migrated 
as ‘dependent’ migrants in the context of family formation or reunification. 
 
Figure 4. Women as percentage of total immigration, average of 28 reporting countries 1950-2009 
 
Source: DEMIG C2C Database. Trend line: third order polynomial.  
 
 
The asymmetrical globalization of migration 
 
To further investigate the changing geography of world migration between 1960 and 2000, we 
calculated country-level immigration and emigration diversity indices that simultaneously capture 
changes in the variety, distance and intensity of international migration. This analysis drew on the 
Global Bilateral Migration Database (GBMD) initially developed by Sussex University (Parsons 
et al. 2005) and extended by the World Bank (Özden et al. 2011) (for methodology, see Czaika 
and de Haas 2014a). Figure 5 depicts the diversity of immigrant populations in terms of the origin 
country variety, the average geographical distance to origin countries as well as the size of 
immigrant populations for each country of the world in 1960 and 2000. Figure 6 shows the 
diversity of emigrant populations in terms of the variety of destinations countries, the average 
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geographical distance to countries of settlement and the size of emigrant population for each 
country in the world in 1960 and 2000.  
 
Figure 5. Immigration Diversification Index Scores in 1960 and 2000 
 
Source: Czaika and de Haas (2014a) 
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Figure 6. Emigration Dispersion Index Scores in 1960 and 2000 
 
Source: Czaika and de Haas (2014a) 
 
Our findings challenge the idea that there has been a fast increase in volume, diversity, and 
geographical scope of migration. The average geographical distance between origin and 
destination countries has increased only slightly from nearly 3,000 km in 1960s to over 3,600 km 
in the 2000s. While several European and former European settler societies now indeed host an 
increasingly diverse array of immigrant groups, we cannot extrapolate this observation to the 
global level. In fact, the relative numbers and diversity of immigration has decreased in several 
regions, particularly in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. Between 1960 and 2010, more 
countries have transformed from a net immigration country to a net emigration country than 
countries have made a reverse migration transition, which reflects a trend towards greater 
concentration of global migration movements towards a relatively limited (and shrinking) 
number of major migration destinations (Czaika and de Haas 2014b).  
  
In Latin America, countries such as Brazil, Venezuela and Argentina have all experienced reverse 
migration transitions. While they previously attracted large numbers of migrants from a highly 
diverse array of countries (in Europe and beyond, including Japan, India, China and Lebanon), 
economic stagnation and political turmoil has diminished immigration and the diversity of Latin 
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American societies in recent decades. This coincided with an increase in the relative importance 
of intra-regional migrations and their transformation from countries of net immigration to 
countries of net emigration, with emigration particularly directed towards the United States, 
Canada and European countries such as Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom. In a similar vein, 
Figure 6 shows that the geographical scope, intensity and diversity of emigration from sub-
Saharan Africa has rather decreased than increased over the post-WWII period.  
 
The idea that international migration has accelerated and has become more diverse therefore 
primarily reflects a Euro- or Western-centric worldview. Migration has perhaps globalized from a 
European and North American destination country perspective, but hardly from a global and 
origin country perspective. In fact, migrants from an increasingly diverse array of non-European 
origin countries concentrate in a relatively small and shrinking pool of prime destination 
countries predominantly located in Western Europe, North America and the Gulf (Czaika and 
de Haas 2014a). The global migration map has thus become more skewed, rather than more 
diverse.  
 
Rather than defying the idea that migration has ‘globalized,’ this seems to reflect the asymmetric 
nature of processes of economic globalization over the past decades. Instead of creating a more 
levelled ‘playing field’, globalization has disproportionally favoured particular countries – or 
rather cities and agglomerations within countries and certain social, ethnic, class and professional 
groups within them – while excluding or disfavouring other countries and groups (Castells 1996; 
ECLAC 2002; Florida 2005; Sassen 1991). As we will see, this is consistent with trends in 
immigration policies, which have increasingly privileged immigration of the skilled and wealthy 
as well as citizens of regional blocks, while maintaining (rather than necessarily increasing) high 
immigration and travel barriers for lower skilled migrants, asylum seekers and non-regional 
(‘third country’) citizens.  
 
3. Determinants and drivers of migration  
 
Perhaps the most important theoretical observation of the DEMIG project is that we need to 
conceptualize migration as an intrinsic part of broader processes of development in origin and 
destination areas rather than an automated or passive reaction to economic, political, 
demographic and environmental “push” and “pull” factors or as a linear function of wage and 
other opportunity differentials. In other words, there is a need for a socially and economically 
embedded understanding of migration. This embedded understanding of migration and our 
empirical evidence shows that factors and processes such as state formation, development, 
labour market structures, inequality and social policies shape migration in complex--though 
structured--and often counterintuitive ways.   
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Development in origin areas  
  
The popular idea that much ‘South-North’ migration is driven by poverty in origin countries 
ignores evidence that most migration neither occurs from the poorest countries nor from the 
poorest segments of the population. In fact, most emigration tends to occur from middle-
income countries and most long-distance migrants tend to come from the relatively better-off 
sections of origin populations (Czaika 2012,Mahendra 2014a). Using new global migration data, 
our research provided an empirical validation of the migration transition hypothesis initially 
proposed by Zelinsky (1971) and further elaborated by Skeldon (1997). This hypothesis links 
phases of the demographic transition (from high to low fertility and mortality) and concomitant 
development processes to distinctive phases in a ‘mobility transition’, in which development 
initially leads to more internal (rural-to-urban) and international emigration. Only when countries 
achieve higher income levels, emigration levels tend to decrease alongside increases in non-
migratory mobility – such as commuting – and immigration, which leads to their transformation 
from net emigration to net immigration countries.  
  
Historical and contemporary experiences of countries in North America, Europe and Asia 
support the idea that countries go through such migration transitions as an intrinsic part of 
broader development processes (de Haas 2007; DeWind et al. 2012; Hatton and Williamson 
1998; Skeldon 2012). Because of a lack of appropirate data, this hypothesis had not been 
subjected to a more formal empirical test and an analysis of the possible causal mechanisms 
explaining these complex associations. Using cross-sectional global migrant stock data from 2000 
contained in the Global Bilateral Migration Database (GBMD), de Haas (2010a) provided a first 
comprehensive assessment of the relation between different variables capturing development on 
the one hand and levels of immigration and emigration on the other.  
   
This analysis provided robust evidence for the validity of migration transition theory, finding an 
inverted U-shaped association between development and emigration. Both bivariate and  
multivariate analyses showed that higher levels of economic and human development – 
measured by GDP per capita and the Human Development Index (HDI) – are initially 
associated to higher levels of emigration, but that emigration decreases with the growth in 
prosperity and development (de Haas 2010a) (see Figure 7). At the same time, the relation 
between development and levels of immigration proves to be robustly positive and 
comparatively linear, confirming the idea that wealthy industrialized societies (inevitably) attract a 
substantial number of immigrants. These findings were confirmed by Clemens (2014) who 
estimated the relationship between income per capita and relative emigrant population size for 
the 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990 census rounds using the extended version of the Global Migrant 
Origin database (Özden et al. 2011).  
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Figure 7. Association between levels of development and migration patterns, 2000 data 
 
Source: de Haas 2010  
  
Interestingly, the same analysis did not find any significant effect of past fertility levels (measured 
by average total fertility rates over the 1970-1990 period) on immigrant and emigrant rates (de 
Haas 2010a). This challenges the emphasis theorists like Zelinsky (1971), Skeldon (1997) and 
Hatton and Williamson (1998) put on demographic factors in order to explain migration 
transitions. This highlights the need for alternative sets of explanations to understand the 
complex and non-linear relationship between development and migration. 
 
At the micro-level, we can understand the positive relation between development and emigration 
if we conceptualize migration as a function of capabilities and aspirations to migrate (Carling 
2002; de Haas 2003; de Haas 2014a). Human and economic development tends to be initially 
associated with increasing emigration, because access to resources – such as money, knowledge, 
and networks –, improved infrastructure, and awareness of economic opportunities and lifestyles 
elsewhere tends to give people the means and desire to migrate to urban areas or foreign lands. 
Processes of modernization, education, and exposure to new ideas change people’s preferences 
in terms of work, lifestyle and perceived material needs. This may lead to increasing aspirations 
to migrate either as an (instrumental) means to realize such new life aspirations or to fulfil the 
more innate, intrinsic meaning attached to the exploration of new horizons. As long as 
aspirations rise faster than local opportunities, we can expect emigration to increase even under 
conditions of fast development (de Haas 2014a).  
  
At the macro-level, the growth and expansion of capitalist economies compels young people to 
migrate to urban areas and international destinations. Peasant livelihoods tend to be undermined 
as a consequence of mechanization, increasing scale of production and trade links, and the 
agrarian sector provides decreasing employment opportunities for a growing population. 
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Simultaneously, increasing education and infrastructure encourages migration to cities and 
abroad, where growing industrial and service-based economies provide job opportunities and 
alternative lifestyles to new generations of young people whose notions of the ‘good life’ have 
changed through education, media, and exposure to returning migrants. The transition from an 
agriculture-based economy to a more diversified, capitalist economy with growing industrial and 
service sectors, inevitably leads to a concentration of economic activities and population in urban 
areas. Although the degree to which such rural-urban transitions spill over in cross border 
movements depends on the rate of urban growth and the creation of domestic employment 
opportunities (de Haas and Fransen 2018), the underlying social and cultural transformation 
leading to changing aspirations and growing disaffection of young people with rural lifestyles is 
structural and therefore largely irreversible.  
 
While transition theory focuses on long-term associations between development and migration, 
the idea of the ‘migration hump’ primarily refers to short to medium-term emigration hikes in the 
wake of such trade reforms and other political-economic shocks. For instance, within the 
context of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Martin (1993) and Martin and 
Taylor (1996) argued that adjustment to new economic conditions is never instantaneous and 
may therefore lead to economic dislocations and rising unemployment, for instance by driving 
Mexican peasants out of business through imports of cheap US agrarian products. Using a 
counterfactual empirical strategy, Mahendra (2014b) found that NAFTA created a ‘migration 
hump’ effect on Mexico-US migration in the first 15-20 years after the enactment of the trade 
agreement. This confirms the idea that even if the long-term effects of trade liberalization would 
be beneficial for the low and middle-income segments of the population (which remains to be 
questioned, and is strongly conditional on the vitality of —and state support for— domestic 
agriculture and industry - see Rodrik 2011) we can expect a short- to medium-term increase in 
emigration in the wake of trade and other economic reforms. Economic dislocations and 
concomitant unemployment can also be triggered by a sudden change of political-economic 
regimes, such as in Central and Eastern Europe (Kureková 2013) and the former USSR after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, or through liberalization of trade and capital markets. 
  
State formation, conflict and political shocks  
 
While states affect key migration drivers through economic, labour market, taxation, social, 
welfare, health care, education and other policies, they also shape migration processes in more 
direct ways, both intentionally and unintentionally. In fact, states often play a crucial role in the 
initiation of international migration, whether in the form of warfare, military occupation, 
colonialism, enslavement, labour recruitment, economic imperialism, political repression, or 
violence (Castles, de Haas and Miller 2014; Hoerder 2002; Massey et al. 1998; Penninx 1982; 
Skeldon 1997). Global migration is highly concentrated in a low number of migration corridors, 
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which to a considerable extent reflect colonial, cultural, and other historical ties between states 
(Czaika and de Haas 2014a; Flahaux and De Haas 2016; Flahaux and Vezzoli 2016; Natter 2014a; 
Vezzoli 2015).  
 
The emergence of ‘migration politics’ is intrinsically linked to the emergence of modern states. 
More than for their feudal and agrarian predecessors, population represented an essential 
economic and political resource for emerging modern states in terms of taxation, workforce and 
military. It was the establishment of modern states that brought the need to define who is 
member of the citizenry, who is not, and to establish a set of rules to determine how such 
membership can be acquired. The right to control the ‘legitimate means of movement’ (Torpey 
1998) of people has been central to the consolidation of centralised national governments in the 
nineteenth century. As a consequence, passports and visas have become key instruments of 
population movement control. While such controls were initially focused on controlling the 
departure of citizens, since the late nineteenth century there has been a shift from states 
controlling emigration to controlling immigration (de Haas and Vezzoli 2011) parallel to an ‘exit 
revolution’ (Zolberg 2007) through the increasing removal of exit controls. The demise of exit 
controls and the increasing adaptation of “diaspora engagement policies” by origin states (de 
Haas and Vezzoli 2011; Gamlen 2008) may have counterbalanced the potential migration-
reducing effects of restrictions by destination country governments for particular migrant 
categories.  
   
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the creation and consolidation of new states 
often coincided with the expulsion, forced assimilation or genocide of unwanted ‘minorities’ that 
were threatening the official, unitary ideology of nation states (Dowty 1987). Particularly when 
notions of citizenship are strongly based on commonly imagined religious or ethnic affiliation 
(cf. Anderson 1983), states are often driven to expel minorities while encouraging the 
immigration of co-religious or co-ethnic population in order to create ‘homogeneous’ 
populations4. Starting from the 1950s, state-formation processes in the wake of decolonization 
and independence crucially shaped world migration. Historical, institutional, socio-cultural, and 
linguistic ties, as well as economic opportunities in the former colonial states encouraged the 
concentration of migration from many former colonies to the former colonising countries such 
as from the Maghreb countries to France; or from Jamaica to Britain (Flahaux and De Haas 
2016; Flahaux and Vezzoli 2016; Natter 2014a). At the same time, however, former colonial 
																																																								
4 The ‘population exchanges’ in post-Ottoman Balkan states, the 1923 population exchange between 
Greece and Turkey and the population exchange following the 1947 partition of India and Pakistan, the 
Palestinian exodus (the Nakbah) during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, and the large-scale displacement and 
genocide during the 1991-1995 Yugoslav wars are some examples of such violent processes of 
‘population homogenization’. States can also redefine who belongs to the nation, an extreme example of 
this being Nazi Germany, where in 1933 Jews were stripped of their citizenship and subsequently 
systematically murdered during the Holocaust.  
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states often acted to prevent emigration from former colonies and newly independent states to 
the former colonial state - particularly governments of socialist or ‘non-aligned’ countries such as 
Algeria, India, and many sub-Saharan African countries. For instance, the apparent decline in 
intra-African migration intensities over the 1960-2000 period seems to be related to the process 
of state formation, rising nationalism and the concomitant imposition of migration constraints in 
the wake of decolonisation (Flahaux and De Haas 2016). 
  
The timing, volume and composition of these migrations varied depending on the level of 
violence, uncertainty and domestic tensions before and after independence. Intuitively, we would 
expect that authoritarianism and violence in origin countries encourages emigration. Analyses on 
forced migration do indeed find significant effects of conflict and violence on the number of 
asylum seekers and refugees (see also Czaika and Hobolth 2014; Hatton 2009; Moore and 
Shellman 2007). However, the effect of authoritarianism on migration is not as straightforward 
as it may seem at first sight. Our empirical analyses did not find a significant effect of levels of 
political terror (Czaika and de Haas 2012) or a lack of political rights (de Haas 2010a) in origin 
countries on the relative size of emigrant populations as a share of origin country populations. 
While this may be partly explained by the underrepresentation of refugees in international 
migration data, we would still expect that political oppression and violence also motivates non-
refugees to leave. However, we can understand such counterintuitive findings if we 
conceptualize migration as a function of aspirations and capabilities instead of a response to 
“push-pull” factors. From this perspective, the hypothetically positive effect of authoritarianism 
on migration aspirations may be counterbalanced by the fact that autocratic states are more likely 
to create practical and administrative obstacles to the emigration of their citizens, thus reducing 
migration capability as aspirations to migrate increase.  
  
We also found that a lack of political freedoms in destination countries has a positive effect on the 
size of immigrant stocks when controlling for other relevant factors (de Haas 2010a). One of the 
explanations for this paradoxical finding is that states that give fewer rights to their citizens – and 
even fewer to migrants—are less sensitive to domestic political pressure for immigration 
restrictions. Thus, states, like those in the Gulf region, have a higher ability to shape highly 
segmented labour markets that are dependent on high immigration but systematically 
discriminate against migrant workers.	 
 
 
Global, international, domestic and community level inequality  
International economic inequalities in the form of wage gaps are the most common explanation 
for international migration, which fits within neoclassical “push-pull” models according to which 
the volume of migration is expected to be proportional to geographical opportunity gaps. While 
this may sound intuitive, our research showed that international inequality is neither a necessary 
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nor a sufficient condition for substantial migration to occur. In fact, “push-pull” models are 
unable to explain real-world migration patterns and can even be misleading, particularly because 
of their inability to explain development-driven emigration hikes. This does of course not mean 
that inequality does not play a role in migration processes, yet it is necessary to distinguish 
different forms and levels of inequality in their complex interactions with other migration 
determinants. While international (between countries) inequality can motivate people to migrate, it 
has limited explanatory power compared to the role of domestic and community-level income 
inequalities. 
 
In fact, it is vital to distinguish between (1) global, (2) international, (3) domestic and (4) 
community-level inequality in origin and destination societies. At the macro-level, drawing on 
global migrant stock data from 2000, Czaika and de Haas (2012) studied how between- and 
within-country inequalities affect patterns of immigration and emigration. First, we found that 
absolute poverty is associated with lower emigration levels, which is consistent with the idea that 
resource constraints can deprive people from the capability to emigrate. Second, we found only 
small and somewhat ambiguous effects of origin country income inequality on the relative size of 
emigrant populations5. This seems to confirm the idea that the relevant social reference group in 
shaping  perceived relative poverty are the communities in which people live rather than a 
country’s entire population6. This resonates with the “new economics of labour migration” 
(NELM) (Stark 1991), which hypothesizes that relative poverty within origin communities can 
provide important migration-motivating factors. This is supported by a body of survey studies 
confirming the role of relative poverty in motivating people to migrate (see for instance Bhandari 
2004; Stark and Taylor 1989; Quinn 2006; Stark et al. 2009).  
 
Our analyses also highlighted the importance of looking beyond gross, country-level income 
inequality, by considering inequalities along more concrete social lines within national 
populations, which can be strongly divided internally. In Suriname, for instance, tensions and 
power inequalities between different ethnic groups combined with the overall uncertainty 
generated by impending independence from the Netherlands in 1975, boosted migration from 
ethnically distinct groups such as the Hindustani and the Javanese (Vezzoli 2015). An analysis of 
migrant population data for a large set of developed and developing countries by Czaika (2013) 
showed that high levels of “horizontal” inequality between ethnic groups are associated to lower 
emigration while higher levels of ‘vertical’ inequality within ethnic groups are associated with 
higher levels of emigration. This seems to corroborate the argument that social comparisons are 
																																																								
5 Migration levels were measured as the percentage of emigrant and immigrant population on the total 
population of each country.  
6 People are more likely to make comparisons within their immediate social networks and pitch their own 
aspirations against the living standards and lifestyles of people within their own communities. They are 
less likely to draw comparisons to the living conditions of urban elites or foreign populations, with whom 
most people are less likely to identify, and whose lifestyles seem out of reach, or are largely unknown.    
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primarily made within concrete social groups. Czaika (2013) suggests that the positive effect of 
within-group inequality on emigration increases with skill levels. This suggests that education 
tends to increase personal life aspirations, which can increase migration aspirations, and that the 
higher skilled also tend to have higher capabilities to realize such aspirations through their access 
to money, knowledge, and social connections (Czaika 2013; de Haas 2014a). 
 
Our research further shows that the role of inequality and poverty may differ for short- and 
long-distance migration, with poverty or other resource constraints typically precluding poor 
people from engaging in long-distance and international migration (Mahendra, 2014b). For 
instance, based on an analysis of nationally representative data from India, Czaika (2012) showed 
that relatively well-off households were more likely to have (male) members moving abroad for 
work or study (mostly in North American, European or Asian destinations), while short-distance 
internal migration is dominated by women from poorer households moving for family reasons.  
 
 
Labour markets and social welfare  
  
Among the most important factors driving migration is the changing structure of labour demand 
in destination societies towards increasingly complex, specialized and segmented labour markets, 
which have generated an intrinsic demand for migrant labour. Piore (1979), the pioneer of dual 
labour market theory, challenged the idea that immigration is fundamentally caused by ‘push’ 
factors in origin societies (such as low wage or unemployment) or wage gaps, and argued instead 
that the demand for migrant labour stems from the fundamental characteristics of labour 
markets in modern industrialized economies. The vital importance of labour demand in 
explaining long-term trends and short-term fluctuations in migration is highlighted by statistical 
evidence that levels of immigration are closely associated to business cycles and job 
opportunities in destination countries (Hatton and Williamson 2005; Czaika 2015b,  Czaika and 
de Haas 2014a)].  
 
Partly because of ageing and the increasing formal labour participation of women, the supply of 
natives willing and able to do manual agricultural, industrial and service jobs (such as catering, 
cleaning and domestic work) has decreased. Social status considerations also help to explain why 
native workers often shun arduous, manual jobs at the bottom of occupational hierarchies even 
in case of high unemployment and reasonable pay, while migrants typically agree to do such jobs 
as long as their primary social group of reference is their family and community of origin. The 
role of inequality in shaping migration processes points to the use of migration as a livelihood 
strategy, allowing families and households to diversify incomes. The idea that migration is a 
group strategy to reduce income risks and to secure future livelihoods falls under the new 
economics of labour migration (NELM) theory initially formulated by Stark (1978); 1991) as a 
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critique on neoclassical migration theories that see migration as a function of decisions by 
income-maximizing individuals. NELM seems particularly relevant for migration occurring in 
the contexts of poverty and economic and political uncertainty prevailing in many ‘poor’ 
societies, but also to explain migration of the relatively poor in industrialized societies. The idea 
that migration can be part of risk spreading rather than income-maximizing strategies provides 
another explanation for migration in the absence of significant wage gaps between origin and 
destination areas.  
 
We can thus expect that welfare and social security policies in origin countries have an important 
indirect influence on migration patterns. While there is an extensive research literature testing the 
existence of a ‘welfare magnet’7 as a migration determinant in destination countries (Borjas 1999; 
Giulietti 2014; Gordon and Handler 1999; Kureková 2013; Levine and Zimmerman 1999; 
UNDP 2009), the role of welfare and social security in origin countries has been largely ignored 
(Mahendra, 2014b). If we conceptualize migration as a function of capabilities and aspirations to 
migrate, the hypothetical effect of origin country social security and welfare on migration 
becomes ambiguous. On the one hand, we could expect that in areas with lower levels of social 
provision	 people would have higher incentives to emigrate in order to spread income risks (cf. 
Massey et al. 1993). On the other hand, higher levels of social security may also endow families 
with the resources and stability to afford the costs and risk of migrating, particularly over larger 
distances and across borders. Our findings suggest that not only the social policies of destination 
countries matter (as argued by Borjas (1999), but that social policy regimes in origin countries 
play an equally, if not more important, role in shaping migration processes.  
 
We tested the existence of a ‘reverse welfare magnet’ for ‘South-North’ migration using macro-
level DEMIG C2C data from 19 destination countries covering the 1985-2010 period. The 
analysis showed that origin country public spending on education, health, and social protection 
reduces international emigration (Mahendra forthcoming). This complements Kureková’s (2013) 
study on the impact of welfare systems on emigration patterns in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE), showing that in CEE countries where social protection figures have been lower, 
unemployment benefit schemes were less extensive and labour market mismatches remained 
unaddressed experienced larger out-migration of relatively deprived people than countries with 
better welfare provisions8. This resonates with the idea that the redistributive provision of (quasi) 
																																																								
7 The ‘welfare magnet’ hypothesis, initially proposed by Borjas (1999), posits that countries with generous 
welfare systems attract a higher number of (particularly lower skilled) migrants. Depending on empirical 
design, data and the specific migration context, empirical tests have yielded mixed results, with generally 
ambiguous – and in any case weak – effects of welfare provisions on immigration (Giulietti 2014; Gordon 
and Handler 1999; Kureková 2013; Levine and Zimmerman 1999; UNDP 2009).  
8 Similar conclusions were reached in the historical study by Khoudour-Casteras (2008, who concluded 
that the rapid decline of German emigration before WWI can be partly explained by the social benefits 
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public goods and services such as school vouchers, free public education, generous health 
benefits, accessible health facilities, unemployment benefits can decrease relative poverty as well 
as the aspiration to migrate as an alternative strategy to acquire such goods and services privately 
through remittances (Mahendra forthcoming). 
 
Yet, studies using micro-level evidence show that the links between social policy and migration 
are more complex than macro-studies may suggest. Analysing Indonesian family life survey data, 
Mahendra (2014) shows that direct interventions in social policy, such as through cash transfers 
to poor people, can increase migration if their migration capabilities increasing income effects 
exceed their  migration aspirations decreasing risk-reducing effects. In fact, cash transfers 
increased internal migration (presumably through releasing resource constraints on short-distance 
migration) within Indonesia but had no significant impact on international migration (where 
migration costs are much higher) (Mahendra 2014a). This is in line with other recent literature 
suggesting that social security schemes - such as various types of cash transfers - and the 
provision of public services such as education may influence short- and long-distance migration 
and that their short- and long-term effects may differ substantially (Angelucci, 2014; Phan 2012; 
Stecklov et al. 2005, Massey et al. 2010), which precludes sweeping generalizations on this issue9.   
 
After this analysis of trends and determinants of international migration, the next analytical step 
of the DEMIG project was to assess the extent to which migration policies have affected 
migration processes in their interaction with other migration determinants. However, before 
embarking upon this empirical analysis, this required an examination of the nature and evolution 
of migration policies, which is developed in the next section. 
 
 
4. The nature and evolution of migration policies  
 
Defining migration policies and policy effectiveness  
 
Given our knowledge about the ways in which economic development, conflict and cultural 
changes, as well as various forms of inequality shape migration processes in complex and 
profound ways, what can we say about the role and effectiveness of migration policies? As the 
previous section highlighted, it is important to distinguish the preponderant role of states in 
migration processes from the more specific role of migration policies. To make this distinction, we 
define migration policies as rules (i.e., laws, regulations, and measures) that national states enact 
																																																																																																																																																																												
introduced by the Bismarck government during the 1880s, which from the perspective of prospective 
migrants offset the relatively low wages in Germany compared to those in the United States. 
9 This seems to echo mixed, and generally rather weak, evidence on the destination country ‘welfare 
magnet’ hypothesis.  
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and implement with the explicit objective of affecting the volume, origin, direction, and internal 
composition of migration	 (Czaika and de Haas 2013a; de Haas and Vezzoli 2011).  Our focus on 
this explicit aim to affect migration is important as it can be difficult to draw a hard line between 
migration and ‘non-migration’ policies (Vezzoli 2014c). For instance, while labour market 
regulations, taxation, social welfare and foreign policies are not usually seen as migration policies, 
they may nevertheless affect migration in indirect, but powerful ways.  
 
The debate – and controversy – on migration policy effectiveness is also haunted by a lack of 
conceptual clarity, in which ‘effectiveness’ is often confounded with ‘effects.’ While the ‘effect’ 
refers to the actual impact of a particular (implemented) law, measure, or regulation, 
‘effectiveness’ refers to the extent to which the policy objectives have been met. Depending on 
whether public discourses or the stated objectives of policies on paper are used as benchmarks 
for evaluating migration outcomes, we may therefore reach different conclusions about policy 
effectiveness (Czaika and de Haas 2013a). Because there is often a considerable discrepancy 
between publicly stated and ‘real’ objectives of a migration policy, this adds an evaluative and, 
hence, subjective dimension to the analysis of the effectiveness of migration polices.  
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Figure 8. Conceptual framework of immigration and emigration policy effects and effectiveness  
  
Source: Czaika and de Haas 2013a; de Haas and Vezzoli 2011) 
  
To improve conceptual clarity, it therefore seems useful to distinguish four levels at which 
migration policies can be conceptualized: (1) public policy discourses; (2) actual migration 
policies on paper; (3) policy implementation; and (4) policy (migration) outcomes (see Figure 8). 
This distinction allows for the identification of three ‘policy gaps’ that can explain perceived or 
real policy failure. First, the discursive gap is the discrepancy between the stated objectives of 
politicians’ – often ‘tough’ – migration discourses and – the often more watered-down – 
concrete policies. Second, the implementation gap is the frequent disparity between policies on 
paper and their actual implementation. Third, the efficacy gap reflects the degree to which the 
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implemented laws, measures, and regulations have the intended effect on the volume, timing, 
direction, and composition of migration, independently and in interaction with other migration 
determinants (Czaika and de Haas 2013a; de Haas and Vezzoli 2011).  
 
As with most policies, migration policies are typically a compromise among multiple competing 
interests, which explains why their objectives are often not singular and cannot be objectively 
defined (Bonjour 2011; Boswell 2007; Boswell and Geddes 2011; Czaika and de Haas 2013a, 
2013b; Freeman 1995; Hollifield 1992a). For instance, while businesses typically lobby in favour 
of more liberal immigration policies, trade unions have historically seen immigration as 
threatening the wages and interests of native workers. Such competing interests also exist across 
and within political parties, governments and bureaucracies. Empirical analyses of DEMIG 
POLICY (see de Haas and Natter 2014) confirmed the hypothesis that the migration issue does 
not neatly cut across the left-right spectrum, but divides political parties internally (see also 
Massey 1999: 313; Odmalm 2011: 1076-1077; Schain 2008: 468).  
 
Perhaps surprisingly, our analysis did not find a clear effect of the ideological orientation of 
governing parties in 21 European and North American countries between 1975 and 2012 on 
changes in immigration policy restrictiveness (de Haas and Natter 2014). While more right-wing 
inclined governments tended to slightly favour liberal entry policies, more left-wing inclined 
governments tended to slightly favour liberal integration (post-entry) policies. However, on the 
aggregate level these effects cancel each other out, and factors such as economic growth, 
unemployment, or previous levels of immigration were much stronger determinants of migration 
policy restrictiveness. To a significant degree, the perception that right-wing parties are ‘tougher’ 
on immigration therefore seems to reflect a ‘discursive’ gap between immigration rhetoric and 
immigration policy practice.  
 
Also in the case of emigration policies, they are likely to reflect the outcome of power struggles 
within governments and bureaucracies of origin states, which should not be perceived as 
homogenous entities (de Haas and Vezzoli 2011; Natter forthcoming). Regardless of their 
position on the autocracy-democracy spectrum, the position of origin states towards emigration 
is often intrinsically ambivalent. They face a trade-off between the perceived economic and 
political benefits of migration, such as generating remittances and creating a political ‘safety 
valve’ by providing an outlet for discontent people, and the perceived costs and risks of 
migration, such as a ‘brain drain’ and the possibility that exiles may form a political opposition 
from abroad. Also here there are considerable gaps between discourse and practice. Political 
leaders may pay lip service to goals such as preventing ‘brain drain’ or ‘combating illegal 
emigration’ - be it to gain diplomatic leverage, to receive financial assistance, or to increase 
control over their own population -, while in practice doing little, either because they lack the 
capacity to do so or because of the economic and political benefits they see in emigration. In 
    
 
IMIn Working Paper Series no. 142 
    28 
addition, states’ capacity to regulate emigration is fundamentally limited by legal (human rights), 
economic and political constraints (de Haas and Vezzoli 2011). In fact, Hollifield’s ‘liberal 
paradox’ seems to apply to emigration policies even more strongly than to immigration policies. 
Only a declining number of authoritarian states with closed economies are willing and capable of 
imposing blanket exit restrictions, partly because leaving one’s country is generally recognized as 
a fundamental human right – which is not the case for entering a country.  
  
The evolution of migration policies  
Analyses of DEMIG POLICY and DEMIG VISA clearly counter the assumption of a generic 
increase in migration policy restrictiveness. Drawing on the DEMIG POLICY databases 
capturing 6,500 policy changes, we conducted a detailed analysis of the evolution of migration 
policies of 45 countries (de Haas, Natter and Vezzoli 2014). Figure 9 depicts the yearly average 
direction of policy change between 1900 and 2014 and shows that since 1945 migration policies 
have overall become less restrictive, with yearly averages consistently below 0.  
 
Figure 9 Yearly average of weighted changes in migration policy restrictiveness, 45 countries, 1900-2014 
 
Source: de Haas, Natter and Vezzoli 2016, based on DEMIG POLICY data 
 
The first half of the 20th century portrays a clear trend toward more restrictiveness, reflecting the 
turn toward protectionism and nationalism affecting Europe and North America during and 
after the Great Depression (Timmer and Williams 1998). This period also coincided with the 
introduction of modern passport systems (Torpey 2000) and an increasing focus on immigration 
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policies, replacing the previous preoccupation with exit policies (Zolberg 2007). The period from 
the 1950s to the 1980s was characterised by an accelerated liberalisation of entry and post-entry 
rights for most migrant categories as part of major, liberalizing overhauls of national migration 
regimes. Since 1990, the proportion of more restrictive policy changes has increased. Besides 
measures targeting border controls, expulsion and irregular migration, this pertained to efforts by 
certain governments to restrict access to citizenship, the immigration of family migrants and 
asylum seekers. Yet, our analysis clearly shows that liberal policy changes have continued to 
outnumber restrictive ones. We should therefore speak of a deceleration of liberalisation rather than a 
reversal towards more restrictive policies (de Haas, Natter and Vezzoli 2016).  
 
These findings corroborate that there are clear legal and institutional constraints regarding the 
extent to which migrants’ rights can be curtailed (Freeman 1995; Hollifield 1992a; Joppke 1998). 
For instance, governments have not succeeded in reversing or abolishing the general right to 
family reunification introduced in the 1960s, as attempts to enact restrictive policies have been 
regularly overturned by national and European courts (cf. Joppke 2001). This overall trend is 
robust for the 22 liberal democracies in Western Europe, North America, Australia and New 
Zealand which are the traditional focus of migration policy research (see de Haas, Natter and 
Vezzoli 2016).  
 
Our analysis of migration policy trends in other countries covered by DEMIG POLICY revealed 
interesting regional differences. Migration policies of Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries, as well as of Morocco, South Africa, Israel and Turkey, show an increasing prevalence 
of liberalising policy changes up to the 1990s and a more balanced picture in recent years, more 
or less in line with the pattern in Western Europe. By contrast, Asian and Latin American 
countries covered by DEMIG POLICY portray an opposite pattern, with rather high levels of 
restrictiveness up to the 1970s, and an opening-up of their immigration regimes since then.  
 
Fluctuations in migration policy restrictiveness are closely tied to broader economic and political 
trends and events. For instance, the peak in less restrictive measures in the late 1980s for CEE 
countries coincides with the fall of the Iron Curtain and the ensuing generic liberalisation of exit 
control policies characteristic of communist states. For the five Asian countries (India, 
Indonesia, South Korea, Japan, China) included in DEMIG POLICY, the dismantling of the 
protectionist economic policies in the 1970s and 1980s coincided with more liberal immigration 
policies in wealthier countries, while the poorer countries in the region decreased exit controls 
and embarked upon pro-active ‘labour export policies’ through recruitment agreements. This 
confirms the idea that liberal economic policies tend to coincide with liberal migration policies 
(cf. Kim 1996).  
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Migration policy restrictiveness in Latin America peaked in the 1970s and 1980s, in a period of 
military coup d’états and the predominance of autocratic regimes. Since the 2000s, however, 
Latin American countries have adopted - at least on paper - highly liberal and human-rights 
oriented migration policies through expanding refugee protections, granting socio-economic and 
family reunification rights to migrants and, in Argentina, even consecrating a right to immigrate 
in 2003 (Cantor, Freier and Gauci 2015; Acosta Arcarazo and Freier 2015). Although this 
tendency seems strongly linked to democratisation, this supposed link between democratisation 
and open migration policies cannot be taken for granted. As FitzGerald and Cook-Martín (2014) 
showed in their historical study on the evolution of immigration policies in the Americas 
between 1790 and 2010, democracies were the first countries to select immigrants by race, and 
autocracies the first to outlaw such discrimination. Gulf countries, for example, have remarkably 
open entry policies although they severely curtail post-entry rights to labour migrants (cf. Ruhs 
2013). We can thus hypothesize that liberal immigration systems are a feature of liberal economic 
systems rather than a characteristic of democratic governance per se.  
 
Although robust across a large number of countries, the overall liberalisation has not been linear 
over time and differs across policy areas and migrant categories: Entry and integration policies 
have consistently become less restrictive, while border control and, since the 1990s, exit policies 
have become increasingly restrictive (see Figure 10). Also, while policies towards unauthorized 
migrants, prospective asylum seekers and family members of low-skilled migrants have become 
more restrictive, a larger number of (generally less-visible and less-advertised) policies targeting 
higher and lower skilled workers, students and also asylum applicant10 have become progressively 
more liberal (de Haas, Natter and Vezzoli 2016). At the regional or national level, trends can 
however differ. For instance, analyses of migration policies targeting Senegalese migrants reveal a 
trend toward more restrictiveness over time - especially regarding entry (Flahaux 2016). As we 
will see below, this often accompanies increasing restrictions of travel visa regimes, which 
officially are not part of immigration regimes, but in function as a means to block the entry of 
potential asylum seekers and presumed visa ‘over stayers’. 
 
However, the overall liberalisation of policies towards low-skilled migrants confirms the 
existence of a significant ‘discursive gap’ between politicians’ ‘tough talk’ and the actual policies 
on paper, which are often responsive to powerful business and trade lobbies who favour 
flexibility in immigration regimes (cf. Facchini, Mayda and Mishra 2011). This lends support to 
the idea that migration policies are often symbolic and are partly or primarily about giving the 
appearance of control (Massey et al. 1998: 288). The increasing deployment of control policies 
																																																								
10 While border controls have increasingly aimed to prevent potential asylum seekers from arriving and 
applying for asylum in the first place, the actual sets of rights of asylum seekers who have arrived in 
destination countries have actually increased. This exemplifies the importance of distinguishing the 
different policy instruments and policy categories.    
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such as border patrolling, the erection of fences, immigrant detention and expulsion exemplifies 
that migration policy discourses and practices have a strong ‘performative’ (Geiger and Pécoud 
2010) dimension. The disproportionate exposure of the public to restrictive policy discourses 
contributes to the desired impression that policies have become increasingly restrictive in general. 
 
Figure 10. Weighted changes in migration policy restrictiveness by policy area, 45 countries, 1945-
2014 
 
Source: de Haas, Natter and Vezzoli 2016, based on DEMIG POLICY data 
 
In reality, many migration policies are designed to attract certain migrant groups. This 
particularly applies to the increasing popularity of policies to attract skilled workers (Czaika and 
Parsons 2017). Analysing skill-specific migration flows from 185 origin countries into 10 major 
OECD destinations over the 2000–2012 period, Czaika and Parsons (2017) find strong evidence 
that (supply-led) points-based systems increase both the volume and, particularly, the average 
skill levels of high-skilled immigration. By contrast, demand-driven systems that are based on job 
availability, complemented by labour market tests and (shortage lists) assessments of labour 
market needs, have rather little and potentially even negative effects on the number of skilled 
migrants. The analysis also shows that skill-selective immigration policies are usually more 
successful in affecting the skill composition rather than the volume of skilled immigration. This 
suggests that skill-selective policy instruments are more effective in ‘filtering out’ or discouraging 
entry of low-skilled workers rather than in attracting the highly skilled (Czaika and Parsons 
2017). This confirms our main finding that the essence of modern migration policies is not their 
growing restriction, but their focus on migrant selection (de Haas, Natter and Vezzoli 2016). 
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The evolution of visa regimes 
 
While policies regulating the legal entry, stay and integration of migrants have shown a 
liberalizing trend over the past decades, restrictive policies have targeted migrants who are 
publicly portrayed as ‘less-desired’ (mainly asylum seekers and some categories of lower skilled 
workers) through a combination of border surveillance, visa policies, carrier sanctions, and 
deportation. These policies seek to prevent migrants from crossing the border in the first place, 
because, once on the national territory, they have access to a certain number of rights, 
particularly those belonging to vulnerable categories like asylum seekers, minors and pregnant 
women.  
   
Although travel visa regulations officially target temporary visitors such as tourists or business 
people, since the 1970s governments see and deploy visas as instruments to curb migration (Czaika 
and de Haas 2014b; Czaika, de Haas and Villares-Varela 2017). For example, West-European 
countries introduced travel visas for ‘guest-worker’ countries such as Turkey and Morocco over 
the 1980s and 1990s in an obvious attempt to prevent people from finding work and joining 
family in Europe. Similarly, our study of the Caribbean region showed that while former colonial 
states introduced border regimes to curb immigration from their former colonies, the 
governments of other potential destination countries also introduced travel visas to discourage 
entry from these newly independent countries (Vezzoli and Flahaux 2017). Additionally, since 
the 1980s, destination countries progressively introduced carrier sanctions to prevent people 
without a visa from boarding airplanes and ships, herewith contributing to the increasing 
‘privatisation’ of migration controls (Neumayer 2006). As visas can generally be imposed through 
directives, executive decrees or other administrative measures, and thus do not require 
cumbersome legal changes, they are seen as a quick, discrete and effective migration policy 
instrument (Czaika and Neumayer 2017).  
 
Our analysis confirmed the importance of visas in international migration regimes. Based on 
DEMIG VISA, which provides global bilateral (country-by-country) coverage of entry visa end 
exit permit requirements between 1973 and 2014, we calculated country-level visa restrictiveness 
indices (see Figures 11 and 12)11. The inbound entry visa restrictiveness index provides yearly scores 
indicating the share of origin countries whose citizens need a travel visa to enter a particular 
destination country. For the outbound entry visa restrictiveness index, we reversed the procedure, 
calculating the share of destination countries for which citizens of each (origin) country need a 
visa (Czaika, de Haas and Villares-Varela 2017).  
 
The analysis shows that overall levels of entry visa restrictiveness have remained remarkably 
																																																								
11 Visa on arrival was computed as visa required.  
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stable at high levels. Around 73 per cent of all bilateral corridors require a visa. Interestingly, 
levels of inbound entry visa restrictiveness are highest in Africa, Asia and Oceania, and 
significantly lower in the Americas and Europe. In fact, levels of visa restrictiveness that African 
and Asian countries impose on citizens from within and outside their own region are roughly 
equal to the levels of visa restrictions African and Asian citizens face themselves when travelling 
abroad. Thus, while OECD countries maintain high levels of entry visa restrictiveness for 
citizens from regions like Africa and Asia, developing countries in the so-called ‘global South’ - 
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and South and South-East Asia - have some of the most 
restrictive outbound and inbound entry visa regimes. 
 
Figure 11 Inbound entry visa restrictiveness12, averages between 2003 and 2013 
 
Source: Czaika, de Haas and Villares-Varela 2017, based on DEMIG VISA data. Note: Dark 
shaded areas indicate countries with high levels of visa policy restrictiveness. 
 
Figure 12 Outbound entry visa restrictiveness13, averages between 2003 and 2013 
 
Source: Czaika, de Haas and Villares-Varela 2017, based on DEMIG VISA data. Note: Dark 
shaded areas indicate countries with high levels of visa policy restrictiveness. 
																																																								
12 Percentage of foreign nationalities requiring an entry visa to travel to each country. 
13 Percentage of countries for which citizens of each country require a visa. 
1970s	
2000s
2000s
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Figures 13 and 14 show how the levels of inbound and outbound visa restrictiveness evolved 
over the 1973–2013 period. Defying popular perceptions of increasing migration restrictions, 
levels of visa restrictiveness were already high back in the 1970s, and the general pattern has 
been one of stabilisation and slight decrease rather than an increase. Our analyses revealed an 
increasing restriction of entry visa regimes in Western Europe and Central and Eastern Africa, 
but a liberalization of visa regimes in Latin America and parts of Asia. At the same time, 
outbound entry visa restrictiveness (representing the degree to which citizens require a visa to 
travel abroad) has decreased for former Communist countries, but has increased for most 
African, South Asian, Middle Eastern and Andean countries. The most clear-cut trend has been 
the lifting of exit restrictions, down from 26 to 16 per cent of all bilateral corridors between 1973 
and 2008, particularly in Europe and the Americas (Czaika, de Haas and Villares-Varela 2017).  
 
Figure 13. Inbound entry visa restrictiveness14, 1973–2013, averages by continent  
 
Source: Czaika, de Haas, Villares-Varela 2017, based on DEMIG VISA data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
14 Percentage of foreign nationalities in the world requiring an entry visa in countries of each region 
(average for all countries in the region). 
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Figure 14 Outbound entry visa restrictiveness15, 1973–2013, averages by continent  
 
Source: Czaika, de Haas, Villares-Varela 2017, based on DEMIG VISA data 
 
Regional bloc formation turns out to be a key dynamic in understanding contemporary global 
visa regimes. Our analyses of visa reciprocity show that 79 per cent of all country pairs have 
symmetrical visa rules and that levels of reciprocity have increased since the mid-1990s, which 
seems to mainly reflect the formation of regional free-travel blocs. Regional unions such as the 
EU, GCC, CARICOM, MERCOSUR, CIS, and ECOWAS have formed clusters of visa 
openness and external closure. Visa-free travel is predominantly realised within regional blocs, 
often coinciding with harmonisation of visa restrictions towards ‘third country’ nations, which 
also explains the slightly decreasing trend of global visa restrictiveness since the 2000s (Czaika, 
de Haas and Villares-Varela 2017). These findings challenge the idea of a growing North-South 
global mobility divide (Mau et al. 2015) and instead, suggest a more stable and complex image 
reflecting the multi-polar nature of international relations and regional bloc formation.  
 
 
5. The effectiveness of migration policies  
   
The unintended consequences of migration policies 
Based on available data and our insights into migration and migration policy trends, what can we 
say about the effects and effectiveness of migration policies? While a number of multi-country studies 
found significant effects of migration policy restrictiveness on the number of migrant arrivals (cf. 
Beine, Docquier and Özden 2011; Mayda 2010; Ortega and Peri 2013), the more relevant 
question is perhaps how policies affect the entire process of migration and the long-term patterns 
and functioning of migration systems. This requires the simultaneous study of the short- and 
long-term effect of migration policies on inflows and outflows. For instance, if we only focus on 
																																																								
15 Percentage of nationals of each region requiring an entry visa in any other country in the world. 
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arrival, but ignore how restrictions affect return movements, we miss an important part of the 
analytical picture. Therefore, our analyses assessed how migration policies not only affect the 
gross number of arrivals but also how they may have unintended knock-on effects on the timing 
of migration, migration through other legal channels and geographical routes or return 
migration. 
 
In our analyses, we identified four ‘substitution effects’ which can limit the effectiveness of 
immigration and emigration restrictions: a) spatial substitution through the diversion of migration 
via other routes or destinations; b) categorical substitution through a reorientation towards other 
legal or illegal channels; c) inter-temporal substitution affecting the timing of migration in the 
expectation or fear of future tightening of policies; and d) reverse flow substitution if immigration 
restrictions interrupt circulation by discouraging return and encouraging permanent settlement, 
making the effect of restrictions on net migration and the growth of migrant communities 
ambiguous (see de Haas 2011b).  
 
a) Spatial substitution effects 
First, spatial substitution effects may occur either through the diversion or deflection of migration to 
countries with less restrictive regulations or through encouraging migrants to use other 
geographical itineraries without changing destination. Drawing on DEMIG C2C and DEMIG 
POLICY covering 38 destination and about 180 origin countries over the 1980 to 2010 period, 
we found robust evidence that migration restrictions significantly deter migration inflows in 
subsequent years but also divert some migration to other destination countries (Czaika and de 
Haas 2018). Yet, there is significant variation with regards to the size of such geographical 
diversion effects. Our analysis shows that ‘destination substitutability’ tends to be stronger when 
respective destination societies are more similar in terms of culture, language and opportunities, 
in which case ‘deterred migrants’ do not abstain from migration per se but rather consider 
alternative destinations (Czaika and de Haas 2018).  
 
Such spatial substitution effects are confirmed by our case studies on the Maghreb (de Haas 
2014b; Natter 2014b) and the Caribbean (Flahaux and Vezzoli 2017). In the Maghreb, and 
Morocco particularly, increasing immigration restrictions by France, Belgium and the 
Netherlands over the 1970s and 1980s contributed to a diversification of migration destinations, 
particularly to Spain and Italy and, to some extent, to the United States and Canada (Berriane, de 
Haas and Natter 2015). The evolution of trans-Mediterranean migration is also a compelling 
example of spatial substitution through the diversion and diversification of terrestrial and 
maritime migration itineraries. Until 1991, Moroccans, Algerians and Tunisians did not need a 
visa to enter several southern European countries such as Spain and Italy. The introduction of 
visa requirements by Spain and Italy in 1991 as part of EU integration and the establishment of 
the Schengen zone also kick-started unauthorized ‘boat migration’ by Moroccans, Algerians, 
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Tunisians and, since the 2000s, increasingly by sub-Saharan Africans. When Spanish coastguards 
started to patrol borders more intensively, this led to a diversification of (Saharan) terrestrial 
routes and maritime crossing points, an increasing reliance on smugglers, rising numbers of 
difficult-to-deport minors and pregnant women crossing (Barbulescu and Grugel 2016), and a 
huge – and unintended – increase in the area to patrol in a quest to control this migration 
(Brachet 2005; Bredeloup and Pliez 2005; Crawley et al. 2016; de Haas 2008).  
  
In the Caribbean, countries whose borders with the former colonial state were ‘closed’ 
experienced a higher diversification of migration destinations than former colonies that retained 
free mobility with their former colonial state (Flahaux and Vezzoli 2017). Vezzoli’s (2015) study 
on the role of borders, independence and post-colonial ties in Caribbean migration provides 
detailed insights into how the specific timing and sequencing of border restrictions and 
independence can affect the spatial diversion of migration. While migration restrictions after 
independence encouraged the concentration of migration and the formation of migration-
facilitating networks in the former colonial state (as in the case of Surinamese migration to the 
Netherlands) migration restrictions before independence enabled a diversion to alternative 
destinations. This was the case for migration from Guyana, which largely shifted from Britain to 
North America, facilitated by the fact that alternative destinations were also predominantly 
English-speaking. This explains why colonial ties not always lead to strong migration between 
former colonies and former colonial states.  
 
b) Categorical substitution effects 
Categorical substitution effects occur when entry through one particular migration channel becomes 
more difficult and migrants reorient toward other legal – or unauthorized – channels. Thus, the 
lack of legal immigration opportunities for low-skilled labour migrants has compelled people 
who primarily migrated for work to use family, asylum or student channels (Harris 2002; Massey 
2004). This happened for instance when European countries cut off legal labour migration from 
former ‘guest-worker’ countries (Castles 2004; van Liempt and Doomernik 2006; Van Liempt 
2007). After the suspension of ‘guest worker’ recruitment in 1973, Maghrebi migration to 
Northwest Europe saw an unexpected continuation largely due to a switch to family migration 
and irregular channels (de Haas 2014b; Natter 2014b). Additionally, while the 1976 US 
Immigration Act made immigration more difficult, migration from Guyana to the US continued 
through an increasing reliance on family reunification, marriage, and visa overstaying. In the case 
of Canada,  Guyanese nationals also increasingly used the asylum channel (Vezzoli 2014a).  
 
Restrictions can also divert migration into irregular channels. In a study of migration to 29 
European states in the 2001-2011 period, Czaika and Hobolth (2014) found that while restrictive 
asylum policies reduce the number of persons claiming protection, a ten per cent increase in 
rejected asylum applications raises the number of (apprehended) irregular migrants by on average 
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about three per cent. Similarly, a ten per cent increase in short-stay visa rejections leads to a four 
to seven per cent increase in irregular border entries. So, while restrictive asylum and visa policies 
lead to a decrease in the number of asylum seekers arriving, this deterrence effect is partly 
counteracted by a considerable (and unintended) reorientation of asylum seekers into irregularity.  
 
c) Inter-temporal substitution effects 
Third, inter-temporal substitution or ‘now or never migration’ may occur if migration surges in the – 
realistic or imagined – expectation of a future tightening of migration regulations. For instance, 
when the Federal Republic of Germany tried to discourage family reunification in the late 1970s, 
family migration increased, since many migrants feared that, eventually, family reunification 
might be forbidden completely (Entzinger 1985). In a similar fashion, there was a surge in 
Caribbean (‘West Indian’) ‘beat the ban’ migration to the UK before 1962, when restrictions 
were introduced with the Commonwealth Immigrants Act (Peach 1968). The long-term effect of 
restrictions can–under certain circumstances–become counterproductive when it is 
outperformed by the pre-measure surge in inflows. For instance, the Netherlands’ government 
pushed for Surinamese independence in 1975 primarily because it was seen as a way to prevent 
migration. However, this prompted about 40 per cent of the Surinamese population to emigrate 
to the Netherlands before visas were introduced in 1980 (Vezzoli 2015).  
 
Not only impending migration restrictions, but also migration liberalizations can generate 
temporary migration surges. Within the EU, the removal of migration restrictions after the fall of 
Berlin Wall and as a consequence of the EU enlargement led to migration surges from countries 
such as Poland and the Baltic republics. However, these surges were temporary, as migration 
subsided and consolidated on lower levels after a few years (de Haas, Vezzoli and Villares-Varela 
2018). The EU enlargement experiences suggest that increases tend to be temporary, particularly 
when potential migrants gain trust that borders will remain open, preventing ‘now or never’ 
reactions. Nonetheless, these very surges can make immigration liberalisations self-defeating if 
they increase pressure on politicians to ‘close the border’. In Ecuador for instance, the 
implementation of universal visa freedom in 20 June 2008 was partially reversed on 1 December 
2008 and 3 September 2010 in reaction to the 28-30 per cent on average increase of immigration 
from newly visa-exempted countries, particularly from China, leading to public discontent 
(Acosta Arcarazo and Freier 2015; Freier 2013). 
   
Inter-temporal substitution effects are confirmed by our multivariate analyses of the effect of 
lifting and introducing visa restrictions (Czaika and Haas 2016). Mirroring the experience with 
EU enlargement, migration flows respond almost immediately to the removal of travel visas and 
even ‘overshoot’ temporarily for a few years before stabilising at lower levels. Interestingly, such 
temporal substitution effects do not systematically occur in anticipation of the introduction of 
visas, which may well be explained by the fact that visa introductions are generally not 
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announced well in advance, unlike changes in immigration law, which are often subject to 
parliamentary discussions, and thus more likely to gain media exposure before being enacted, 
herewith giving (prospective) migrants more time to anticipate future legal changes.  
 
d) Reverse flow substitution effects 
Reverse flow substitution effects occur when immigration restrictions discourage return migration, 
push migrants into permanent settlement and therefore interrupt circulation. Several earlier 
studies have argued that restrictive immigration policies discourage return migration, such as in 
the case of Turkish and Moroccan ‘guest worker’ migration to North-West Europe, where many 
temporary workers eventually settled after the post-1973 recruitment ban (De Mas 1990; 
Entzinger 1985), as well as for Mexican migration to the United States (Massey, Durand and 
Pren 2016).  
 
Reverse flow substitution effects were also confirmed by our quantitative analyses of the 
introduction and removal of travel visa requirements (Czaika and Haas 2016). Drawing on 
DEMIG C2C and DEMIG VISA covering 38 reporting countries and 190 origin countries over 
the 1970-2010 period, our results yielded robust evidence that, on average, the immigration-
reducing effect of visa restrictions was largely or entirely counterbalanced by their emigration 
(return) reducing effect. Visa requirements significantly decrease inflows (67 per cent on 
average), but also outflows (88 per cent on average) of the same migrant groups, yielding a 
circulation-interrupting effect of 75 per cent on average (Czaika and Haas 2016).16 We also found 
that the circulation-interrupting effects of immigration restrictions severely reduce the natural 
responsiveness of (unconstrained) migration to economic fluctuations and job opportunities in 
destination countries (Czaika and Haas 2016). Visa-free migration strongly correlates with 
business cycles in destination societies, with immigration surging during high economic growth 
and entries decreasing and returns increasing during economic downturns. By contract,  
migration is much less responsive to economic cycles in visa-constrained migration corridors. 
 
Our study also found that the effects of lifting and introducing migration restrictions tend to be 
asymmetrical, while  liberalizing measures often have immediate effects, the effects of restrictions 
may be smaller and tend to take more time to materialize (Czaika and Haas 2016). So, migration 
policy change in a liberal direction does not have the reverse (‘mirror’) effects of a policy change 
in the opposite, more restrictive, direction. The strong migration-facilitating function of migrant 
networks (for recent quantative evidence, see Beine, Docquier and Özden 2011) are a likely 
explanation for these lagged effects. Once a certain number of migrants have settled at the 
destination, migration processes tend to gain their own momentum over time, and can therefore, 
to a lesser extent, continue irrespective of their initial causes (de Haas 2010b; Massey 1990). This 
																																																								
16 These are average effects. The specific inflow-outflow trade-off is likely to vary according to contextual 
factors such as the strength of migrant networks, the ease of acquiring visas, and other migration policies. 
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exemplifies that restrictions tend to become less effective, and substitution effects are more likely 
to occur with an increase in the number of migrants that have already settled at the destination.   
 
Reverse flow substitution effects were also confirmed by analyses combining DEMIG data with 
the Migration between Africa and Europe (MAFE) surveys conducted in Senegal. This study showed 
that Senegalese migrants in France, Italy and Spain became less likely to return with the 
increasing tightening of entry restrictions, while policies regulating the integration and return of 
migrants do not have an effect on returns. This suggests that the decision to return depends on 
the prospect of re-migrating again after return (Flahaux, 2016).  
 
In the same vein, a DEMIG-related qualitative study based on 40 interviews with Indian 
researchers based worldwide showed that policy restrictions tend to reduce international mobility 
also among the highly skilled (Toma et al. 2018). Foreign researchers and academics with 
aspirations to move elsewhere, or to return to their countries of origin delay their subsequent 
moves and stay put in their countries of destination until they obtain permanent residency or 
citizenship rights as a means of ‘insurance’ for further mobility. This exemplifies the importance 
of policies in affecting the ‘retention’ and ‘redirection’ of migration. The acquisition of 
destination country citizenship sets migrants free to either return or move on without fear of 
losing their right to re-migrate. This suggests that extending rights to immigrants can thus 
paradoxically increase circulation on the longer term.  
 
  
6. Conclusion  
 
This paper reviewed trends and drivers of international migration over the post-WWII period, as 
well as the effect of migration policies on the volume, direction, timing, and selection of 
migration processes. The main insights from this analysis can be summarized as follows:  
 
 Questioning popular images of rapidly increasing migration, international migration has 
remained remarkably stable at levels of around 3 per cent of the world population. Rather than a 
global acceleration of migration, evidence shows that main migratory shifts have been 
directional, particularly through the emergence of Europe and the Gulf as new global 
migration destinations. With the transformation of (Western) Europe as the predominant 
origin of colonizers and migrants into a major destination, an increasing share of the 
global inter-continental migrant population has become of Asian, Latin American and, to 
some extent, African origin. The idea that international migration has accelerated and has 
become more diverse therefore primarily reflects a Euro- or Western-centric worldview. 
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 Migration needs to be seen as an intrinsic part of broader processes of development and state formation in 
origin and destination societies. ‘Push-pull’ models and conventional neoclassical migration 
theories are unable to explain real-world migration patterns and can be misleading, 
particularly because of their inability to explain development-driven emigration hikes. 
Confirming ‘transition theories’ (Zelinsky 1971, Skeldon 1997), the relation between 
development and levels of migration is complex and fundamentally non-linear. From an 
origin country perspective, economic and human development in low-income societies 
tends to initially increase internal as well as international migration, essentially because it 
increases people’s capabilities and aspirations to migrate as well as the migration-
facilitating function of improvements in transport, travel and communication 
infrastructure. At the same time, the increasingly structural complexity and segmentation 
of labour markets (Piore 1979) and concomitant increases in educational levels and 
occupational specialization encourage people to migrate for reasons of work, education 
and, consequently, family.  
 
 International inequality is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition for migration to occur, and 
migration can therefore not be reduced to a function of wage and other international 
opportunity differentials. Most migration occurs between middle-income and high-
income societies, with most migrants from low-income countries belonging to middle-
income groups, and with the poorest and most vulnerable populations often lacking the 
resources to cross borders. This defies common perceptions in public debates and even 
some academic circles (cf. Collier 2013) which largely reduce the essence of global 
mobility to a movement from poor countries in the ‘South’ to wealthy countries in the 
‘North’, ignoring much more complex migration realities. Absolute poverty is associated 
with lower emigration levels, which is consistent with the idea that resource constraints 
tend to deprive people from the capability to emigrate. In line with the ‘new economics 
of labour migration’ (Stark 1991) relative poverty within origin communities is a more 
relevant migration determinant than inequalities on the national or international level, 
which have weaker and rather ambiguous effects on migration.  
 
 ‘Non-migration policies’ have profound effects on migration as they shape fundamental migration 
determinants such as labour market structures, income levels, infrastructure, education and 
social security. Policies with regards to issues such as labour markets, education, health 
care, welfare and social security pursued by origin and destination states do not explicitly 
target migration. Nevertheless, they can have important and complex effects on 
migration by endowing people with resources that increase their capabilities to migrate, 
yet potentially decrease their aspirations to migrate. This points to the relevance of 
institutional-structural factors (beyond migration policies and income levels) in affecting 
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migration through their indirect effect on livelihood security, relative poverty, access to 
resources and people’s life aspirations. Evidence for possible (‘reverse’) welfare magnet 
effects also suggest that public policies that do not directly target migration may have 
strong indirect effects on migration. Redistributive provision of public goods and 
services such as school vouchers, health benefits and unemployment benefits can 
decrease relative poverty as well as the aspiration to migrate. On the other hand, direct 
social policy interventions such as cash transfers to poor families could increase 
migration if their migration-capabilities increasing effect exceeds their migration-
aspirations decreasing, risk- and relative deprivation-reducing effect, Additionally, while 
the establishment of schools in rural communities can reduce migration in the short-
term, it can increase it in the long-term because of the migration-aspirations increasing 
effects of education.  
 
 Although ‘tough’ political rhetoric may suggest otherwise, immigration policies have generally seen a 
liberalising trend. Rather than growing restrictiveness, the evolution of migration policy 
regimes is characterised by an increasing complexity through the development of more 
and more sophisticated sets of policy instruments targeting particular immigrant groups. 
The period from the 1950s to the 1980s was characterised by an accelerated liberalisation 
of entry and post-entry rights, whilst since 1990 the proportion of more restrictive policy 
changes has increased. However, our analysis clearly shows that liberal policy changes 
have continued to outnumber restrictive changes. We should therefore speak of a 
deceleration of liberalisation rather than a reversal towards more restrictive policies. On 
the one hand, this seems to confirm the theoretical argument that immigration policies of 
Western liberal democracies have a built-in tendency to become more liberal through a 
combination of ‘client politics’ and employers’ lobbies (Freeman 1995), ‘embedded 
constraints’ in the form of constitutional norms and principles protecting the human 
rights of migrants (Hollifield 1992a) and the concomitant role of courts in overturning 
attempts by elected leaders to restrict immigration and travel of foreigners (cf. Joppke 
2001). On the other hand, also various non-democratic regimes have seen a liberalisation 
of immigration policies. This suggests that liberal immigration systems are rather a 
feature of liberal economic systems rather than that they are a characteristic of democratic 
governance per se.  
 
 Modern migration policies are about selection rather than numbers. The analysis highlighted the 
limitations of conceiving and measuring migration policies in terms of ‘overall 
restrictiveness’, which conceals the underlying structural changes that migration policies 
have undergone and the fact that migration policies tend to target specific migrant 
categories. Migration policies are typically ‘mixed bags’ of measures, containing multiple 
laws, regulations and decrees that target various national, skill, and income groups in 
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quite different and often contradictory ways. Rather than limiting the numbers of 
migrants coming in, the real aim of most migration policies is to increase the ability of 
states to control who is allowed to immigrate. New layers of selection, based on criteria 
such as skill, wealth or family background of migrants, has been superimposed on 
national or ‘racial’ origin criteria that dominated earlier policy making in the Americas (cf. 
FitzGerald and Cook-Martín 2014) and elsewhere. Migration regimes thus work as filters 
rather than taps. 
 
 While rules around legal entry, stay and exit of most migrant categories have generally 
been relaxed, a combination of visa and border control policies (such as carrier sanctions, 
detention and deportation) have served to prevent the entry of asylum seekers and other 
‘unwanted migrants’, such as prospective unauthorized workers. Visa policies play an 
important role in states’ attempts to prevent people from certain countries of origin from 
entering the national territory and have access to basic (human and migrant) rights upon 
arrival. Our analysis showed that visa regimes have been restrictive and rather stable over 
time (again defying the idea of growing restrictiveness), and that free mobility is primarily 
realised within regional blocks. This challenges the idea of a growing global mobility 
divide (Mau et al. 2015) between ‘North’ and ‘South’, and exemplifies the multi-polar and 
multi-layered nature of international relations.  
 
 Although media images and political discourses often suggest otherwise, borders are not beyond control 
and migration policies have not generally failed. The large majority of migrants abide by the law 
and migrate through legal channels, in the possession of visas and other necessary 
paperwork. The fact that immigration to many countries has continued or increased over 
the past decades partly reflects a de facto liberalisation of immigration policies. In fact, the 
increasingly sophisticated and complex instruments of migration regimes seem to 
generally achieve their objectives, that is, to influence the selection (rather than volumes) 
of migrants. They increasingly follow an economically utilitarian and class-based logic 
and narrative in determining which migrants are given preferential access to legal 
opportunities for migration and settlement - and which not.  
 
 Although migration policies are generally effective, their capacity to ‘steer’ migration is limited, and under 
certain circumstances they can have unintended and sometimes counterproductive effects. These 
‘substitution effects’ can undermine the effectiveness of migration controls by (1) 
diverting migration through other geographical routes and destinations (spatial 
substitution), (2) other legal and unauthorized channels (categorical substitution), (3) 
“now or never” migration surges in anticipation of restrictions (intertemporal 
substitution) and (4) by discouraging return and interrupting circulation (reverse flow 
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substitution). Such substitution effects tend to be particularly strong if there is a 
discrepancy between migration policies and more fundamental migration determinants 
such as destination country labour demand and development, or conflict in origin 
countries.  
 
 These substitution effects expose the difficulties of reconciling various migration policy objectives, such as 
the wish to limit immigration on the one hand, and to encourage return and circulation 
on the other. Immigration restrictions simultaneously reduce immigration and return, 
which renders the effect on net migration and the growth of migrant communities 
theoretically ambiguous. This tends to be particularly the case where significant migrant 
communities have already been established at the destination, in which migrant networks 
tend to facilitate the various substitution effects. Besides bringing down overall levels of 
circulation, the circulation-interrupting effects of immigration restrictions also severely 
reduce the much-desired responsiveness of (unconstrained) migration to economic 
fluctuations and job opportunities in destination countries.  
 
This evidence does not necessarily mean that governments cannot or should not control 
migration. Rather, it shows that liberal immigration policies do not necessarily lead to mass 
migration and that ill-conceived migration restrictions can be counterproductive. Free migration 
is often strongly circulatory, as we see with migration within the EU. The more restrictive entry 
policies are, the more migrants want to stay. 
 
Last but not least, the evidence in this paper shows the importance of looking beyond migration 
policies. A fundamental mismatch between structural migration determinants – such as low-skilled 
labour demand in the absence of legal migration channels, or violence and conflict in the 
absence of asylum channels – is likely to translate into increasing unauthorized border crossings 
and concomitant smuggling, as well as an increasing incidence of migrants ‘overstaying’ the 
duration of their visas.  Shifting trends and patterns of migration are not uniquely, or not even 
mainly, the result of migration policies. We therefore have to examine the general role of 
government policies in explaining international migration. Future research should therefore aim 
to establish more comprehensive assessments of the ways in which economic regimes, labour 
markets policies, inequality, education and social security affect trends and patterns of 
immigration and emigration. If we achieve a better understanding of the ways in which processes 
of development and social transformation in destination and origin countries affect long-term 
migration patterns more generally, we are also in a better position to assess the specific role and 
effectiveness of migration policies adopted by origin and destination states.  
 
Given the importance of structural migration determinants such as economic development, 
labour market structure, education, social stratification, income inequalities, relative poverty, 
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welfare and social security in shaping long-term migration processes, it is important to assess the 
extent to which migration policies can shape the volume, composition, timing or geographical 
direction of migration independently and in interaction with other migration determinants. In fact, 
perceived or real migration policy ‘failure’ is generally explained by an inability or unwillingness 
to take into account the complex and often counterintuitive ways in which structural social, 
economic and political factors affect migration in mostly indirect, but powerful ways, which 
largely lie beyond the reach of migration policies. 
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Annex 1. DEMIG databases  
 
The DEMIG C2C (‘country-to-country’) dataset covers bilateral migration flow data for 34 
reporting countries17 over the 1946-2011 period. Data were was collected from original national 
sources, cover flows by country of residence (COR), citizenship (COC) and/or birth (COB) and 
comprise about 50,000 country-to-country year dyads and over 2.5 million18 data points. In 
addition, the DEMIG TOTAL dataset reports total immigration, total emigration and total net 
migration for up to 163 countries ranging from several decades to over one century, covering 
15,792 data points. These databases provide unprecedented detail of flow data in terms of 
historical depth, the inclusion of several countries outside Europe and North America and 
gender breakdown (for more details on DEMIG TOTAL and DEMIG C2C, see De Haas, 
Vezzoli and Villares-Varela 2014).  
  
In order to operationalize and measure policies, we also developed two policy databases. 
DEMIG POLICY captures over 6,500 changes in migration policies of 45 countries19 between 
1946 and 2013. Besides extending the geographical and historical coverage of other migration 
policy databases (among others:  Beine et al. 2016; Bjerre et al. 2015; Ellerman 2013; Mayda and 
Patel 2004; Ruhs 2011), DEMIG POLICY attempted to overcome the ‘receiving country bias’ 
by also including emigration policies. It is based on an elaborate coding system that distinguishes 
between entry, post-entry (integration), exit and border control policies, categorises specific 
policy tools and target groups, and measures changes in policy restrictiveness weighted by their 
relative importance (for more details on DEMIG POLICY, see de Haas, Natter and Vezzoli 
2015). DEMIG VISA tracks annual bilateral (country-by-country) entry visa end exit permit 
requirements for 214*237 countries over four decades (1973-2014), covering 1,135,680 data 
points in total. Information on visa requirements was drawn from the IATA Travel Information 
Manuals and was entered manually (for more details on DEMIG VISA, see Czaika, de Haas and 
Villares-Varela 2017). 
 
For more information on the DEMIG databases, and for access to the data itself see 
https://www.imi-n.org/data  
 
																																																								
17 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA and Uruguay. 
18 The exact number is of data points is 2,503,584.  
19 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, 
Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America and Yugoslavia. 
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